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Sexualitya b s t r a c t
This article explores the ways in which coupledom is promoted through contemporary family policy in
the UK. It does this in the context of dominant political discourses suggesting that broken relationships
are a major political problem and the cause of almost all that is wrong with British society today. The
paper performs an analysis of recent family policies, revealing narratives claiming that stable coupled
relationships are the foundation of a strong nation. The reverse of this narrative, therefore, is that to
not be in—or even worse, to not even aspire to be in—a coupled relationship is not just a personal failure,
but a failure for the nation as a whole. The article therefore argues that the UK government encourages a
particular type of intimate relationship, despite an increasing recognition of ’diverse’ family forms. Build-
ing upon Rich’s notion of compulsory heterosexuality, the article concludes that what we are witnessing
in current British society is not compulsory heterosexuality, but compulsory coupledom.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Previous research has highlighted the importance of sexuality in
deﬁning the parameters of nationhood, noting that heterosexuality
can be seen as ‘foundational to constructions of the nation-state’
(Nast, 1998: 191; Mayer, 2000). Existing studies have exempliﬁed
the ways in which the nuclear family and heterosexual conjugal
coupledom have been invoked as the bedrock of post-war Britain
by both centre-left and conservative right governments, providing
the cornerstone of the welfare state as well as the ‘enterprise cul-
ture’ that gradually led to its erosion (Cooper and Herman, 1991;
Smith, 1994, 2007). However, it has been widely argued that in re-
cent decades British society has witnessed ‘a certain disruption and
destabilization of heterosexuality’ (Richardson, 2000: 3), with citi-
zenship now no longer necessarily always tied to heterosexuality
in legal and political discourse (Stychin, 2006a). One important
dimension of this is the ways in which lesbian and gay couples ap-
pear to have been incorporated into the ‘charmed circle’ not just of
accepted sexual practices (Rubin, 1984), but also ofﬁcial imagin-
ings of the British nation-state. However, in this article I ask
whether the inclusion of same-sex relationships could be seen to
be simultaneously opening up and narrowing down the charmed
circle of ‘appropriate’ intimacies. I will go onto argue that despite
the supposed increasing acceptance of sexual diversity, an exclu-
sionary rhetoric of ‘family values’ still continues to circulate within
policies that are seeking to create equality.The article focuses upon changes to family policy since the New
Labour government came to power in 1997. The period of govern-
ment under New Labour was particularly important for lesbian and
gay equality in Britain as there were a number of signiﬁcant legis-
lative reforms that saw lesbian and gay couples achieve almost full
citizenship status. Family law, employment law, equality and
diversity legislation all began to recognize lesbian and gay rights,
with some of the most signiﬁcant moves being the Civil Partner-
ship Act of 2004, and the right for lesbian and gay partners to adopt
from 2002 (Browne, 2011; Peel and Harding, 2008). Under New La-
bour, Britain witnessed a dramatic shift away from the previous
Conservative (1979–1997) governments’ privileging of heterosexu-
ality. Moreover, further reform is taking place, with legislation over
‘same-sex marriage’ currently passing through parliament.
These signiﬁcant moves towards full (sexual) citizenship have
led some commentators to take a highly optimistic overview of
the gains that have been won for lesbian and gay people (Weeks,
2007).1 Yet in this article I argue that caution is needed when it
comes to celebrating these newfound rights and responsibilities. It
is important that we take into account the cultural, economic, and
political climate in which this new legal landscape has emerged.
The state recognition of same-sex partnerships comes at a time
when Britain is witnessing the increasing disintegration of the
nuclear family, with rising divorce rates, an increase in lone-parents,
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Budgeon, 2004). In this context, the recognition of same-sex partner-
ships was seen by some policy makers as a way to actively promote
the values of long-term coupledom.
In this article I explore what happens when the nation-state is,
at one level, no longer attempting to privilege heterosexuality but,
at the same time, continues to promote particular forms of inti-
macy and family life. I question whether a diverse range of inti-
mate attachments are now genuinely included into the imagined
British nation, and ask what space there is for relationships that ex-
ist outside of coupled sexual-love, such as friendships, multiple
partners, or being single. I propose that the British nation may
now best be thought of as founded upon mononormativity rather
than solely heteronormativity. Here, mononormativity refers to
the ‘ideological force of couple culture’ (Budgeon, 2008: 302), the
presumed desirability of coupledom, and discrimination against
those whose intimate lives do not ﬁt this conventional dyadic form
(see Adeniji, 2001; Barker and Langdridge, 2010; Pieper and Bauer,
2005; Wilkinson, 2012). Adrienne Rich (1980) introduced the no-
tion of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ to describe the ways in which
heterosexuality is enforced through societal pressures and eco-
nomic incentives; this article examines how these now help to
maintain not just heteronormativity but also mononormativity.
Consequently I argue that what we are witnessing in current Brit-
ish society is no longer compulsory heterosexuality, but compul-
sory coupledom.
The article thus proposes that the concept of sexual citizenship,
which has been pivotal for much geographical work on sexual
rights and equality (Bell and Binnie, 2000, 2006), needs to also be
considered in relation to debates around intimate citizenship
(Hubbard, this issue; Plummer, 2001, 2003; Roseneil, 2010). As
Plummer (2001: 242) outlines, intimate citizenship can be seen
as a ‘broader’ more ‘inclusive concept’, ‘one that is less focussed
on the sexual’. Plummer (2001: 238) argues that intimate citizen-
ship enables us to group together ‘a series of somewhat disparate
concerns around personal life’ such as ‘single parenting’, ‘cohabita-
tion’, ‘the value of living alone’, ‘voluntary childlessness’; and ‘adult
friendships’. Focussing upon intimate citizenship allows for the
inclusion of a broader array of personal attachments that are not
always directly related to sexuality, and helps challenge the ways
in which sexual-love relationships are seen to take precedence
over other forms of intimate attachment.
The ﬁrst half of the article outlines some of the key shifts in
family policy that have occurred in Britain since 1997, highlighting
the move from the privileging of the married heterosexual nuclear
family to the recognition of a broader range of diverse family for-
mations. Data gathered for this article comes from an archive of
material including government consultation documents, policy pa-
pers, and parliamentary debates.2 My analysis pays particular atten-
tion to the language used to talk about coupledom, and draws out
the ways in which long-term coupledom is portrayed not just as a
private good, but as having wider beneﬁts for society, and the na-
tion-state.3 It demonstrates how stable coupled relationships contin-
ued to be promoted as the foundation of a ‘decent’ and good society
under New Labour. In the second half of the article I explore which
subjects are excluded from these new imaginings of the British na-
tion, and ask who exists on the margins of this supposedly inclusive
new family policy. In this section I argue that citizenship is no longer2 A number of these policy documents affect England and Wales only, as the
Scottish Parliament are currently developing their own family policy framework.
3 I conducted a critical discourse analysis of a range political and media debates
about coupledom in order to highlight the discursive construction of singleness as a
‘problem’. I situate my analysis within a particular historical moment and seek to
highlight the changing political context in which these policies have developed (see
Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Fairclough, 2000).
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homosexual but between the coupled and the non-coupled. I con-
clude the article by offering some thoughts about why these ‘new
equalities landscapes’ arose at this particular point in history and
also consider the potential future directions these policies might
take under the current Conservative-led coalition government.4
2. The shifting contours of family policy in Britain
When New Labour came to power in 1997 they claimed to offer
a ‘third way’ between the socialist left-wing values of ‘Old Labour’
and the neoliberal and pro-market views of the Conservative party.
However, a number of commentators have questioned just how
‘new’ New Labour policies were, and, as Powell (2000: 54) notes,
New Labour’s ‘continuities with the Conservatives far outweigh
those with Old Labour’. Powell (2000: 53) therefore claims that
New Labour policy might be best summarized by the acronym of
PAP: ‘pragmatism and populism’, given the ways their policies
marked a moved towards the centre ground of politics, and often
pandered to public opinion. This populist and pragmatic approach
can clearly be seen when we examine New Labour family policy at
the beginning of their time as government, as these initial docu-
ments about the family often displayed strong continuities with
preceding Conservative family policies and programmes (Lister,
2001).
Such continuities are perhaps surprising given the Conservative
government had introduced a ‘back to basics’ campaign during the
1990s which was strongly supportive of the traditional nuclear
family and the institution of marriage (e.g. the Family Law Act,
1996). Alongside this was the viliﬁcation of family breakdown,
and a moralistic disapproval of family forms deviating from the
heterosexual nuclear family (see Edwards and Duncan, 1997, for
an overview of the Conservative party’s demonisation of lone
motherhood). Initial New Labour policy documents proclaimed
marriage as the superior family form which needed to be strength-
ened, despite the fact that the New Labour government were
attempting to present itself as less morally prescriptive than its
conservative forebears, and more tolerant of diverse family forms
(Home Ofﬁce, 1998; see Barlow and Duncan, 2000b for an over-
view). For example, at the start of New Labour’s time in ofﬁce, they
published the ﬁrst governmental consultation document written
speciﬁcally on the family — Supporting Families (1998), Chapter
Four of this was entitled ‘Strengthening Marriage’. This part of
the consultation claimed that there was a need ‘to strengthen mar-
riage to help more marriages succeed’ (Home Ofﬁce, 1998: 30), and
argued that:
Family life is the foundation on which our communities, our
society and our country are built. Families are central to this
Government’s vision of a modern and decent country. [...] Fam-
ilies are the heart of our society (Home Ofﬁce, 1998: 4).
In this document marriage was seen as the foundation of family
life, and was portrayed not just for the beneﬁt of individuals and
their children, but as something with wider beneﬁts for society.
Long-term conjugal coupledom was depicted as essential to
community and the future of the nation, thus echoing Berlant
and Warner’s description of heteronormativity, where they high-
light the ways in which:
[C]ommunity is imagined through scenes of intimacy, coupling,
and kinship; a historical relation to futurity is restricted to gen-
erational narrative and reproduction [...] this privatized sexual4 The coalition government came to power in May 2010 when the minority right-
wing conservative government secured the support of the Liberal Democrats (a party
traditionally associated with the centre-ground of UK politics).
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and normalcy. This sense of rightness – embedded in things and
not just in sex – is what we call heteronormativity (1998: 554)
Supporting Families was described by Barlow and Duncan
(2000b): 129 as a clear attempt at social engineering, promoting
certain ‘desirable family forms’ over other ‘less-favoured family
practices’. Some of the responses to the consultation (Home Ofﬁce,
1999) therefore criticized the ‘Strengthening Marriage’ Chapter for
its outdated focus upon heterosexual marriage, and its failure to
recognise the diverse range of family formations that exist in Brit-
ain, such as same-sex partnerships.
Consequently, subsequent New Labour policy signaled a grad-
ual acceptance of family forms beyond the heterosexual nuclear
family, with one of the most signiﬁcant moves being the introduc-
tion of Civil Partnerships in 2004. This recognition of same-sex
partnerships was, in part, a result of campaigns for lesbian and
gay equality, including pressure from within the Labour party
and Civil Service. However, it was also a move that enjoyed popular
support, with 83% of respondents to a government consultation
stating that they supported Civil Partnership (Women and Equality
Unit, 2003). Accordingly, the government shifted its focus away
from promoting just heterosexual marriage, towards the recogni-
tion of a diverse range of family formations, signaling a move from
‘the family’ to ‘families’.
During New Labour’s time in government there was hence a sig-
niﬁcant change in family policy, with ofﬁcial pronouncements
beginning to acknowledge that the traditional family unit was
changing and that families need not always based around the het-
erosexual dyad. This shift can be seen in the titles of their 1998 pol-
icy document Supporting Families, to their 2010 Green Paper,
Support for All. Another example of this transition can be seen in
the Families in Britain Evidence Paper (DCSF, 2008: 7), which stated
that ‘families come in all shapes and sizes’ and ‘there is no such
thing as a typical family in 21st Century Britain’. The government
now claimed that ‘a modern and effective family policy must also
be based on the understanding that family means more than just
parents and their children’ (DCSF, 2010a: 21). Yet, it is questionable
whether the New Labour government ever fully grasped the range
of family formations that existed in Britain, as throughout these
policy documents often the only examples given provide a limited
range of ‘diverse family formations’, and ‘family’ was still often
seen to amount to little more than ‘parents, grandparents and
carers’ (DCSF, 2010a: 1).
So although New Labour family policy seemed to turn its focus
away from heterosexual marriage to espouse a wider range of com-
mitted and loving relationships, these relationships were still often
limited to long term coupledom or biological familial forms of kin-
ship. It was clear that the government was still trying to uphold the
‘right’ kind of family and the right kind of couple. Long-term cou-
pledom was still often portrayed as more desirable than other
forms of relationship (see DCSF, 2008; LCD, 2002). Policy docu-
ments still continued to promote the importance of ‘strong and
stable relationships’ and ‘committed couples’, with the govern-
ment claiming that ‘[w]arm, loving and stable relationships matter
more for our happiness and wellbeing than the legal form of a rela-
tionship’ (DCSF, 2008: 4). This document goes onto outline how it
was no longer the actual legal contract of marriage that was seen
as important, but the values of love, commitment and stability be-
tween parents. Government policy was now focusing on the
importance of long-term coupled relationships, regardless of sex-
ual orientation, and regardless of legal contract. However, although
this deﬁnition of ‘warm, loving and stable relationships’ allowed
non-married (but committed) couples to be included into these
idealized notions of ‘the family’; there was no mention of loving
stable relationships between multiple partners or between friends;Please cite this article in press as: Wilkinson, E. Learning to love again: ‘Broke
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.02.012notions of ‘love’ and ‘commitment’ were still predominantly tied to
the couple form. Underpinning New Labour’s mononormative fam-
ily policy was the assumption that long-term coupled relationships
provided the most stable environment in which to bring up chil-
dren (DCSF, 2008; Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2007). Thus as Richardson and
Turner (2001: 337) highlight, ‘modern citizenship regards parent-
hood in ‘normal’ families, rather than heterosexuality as such, as
the deﬁning characteristic of the ‘average’ citizen and as the basis
of social entitlement’. Those who exist outside of these traditional
familial structures (e.g., those who raise children in alternative
ways, the un-coupled, or the childless) are marginalized within
these representations of the ideal household. Under New Labour
there was still a strongly couple-centric understanding of ‘the fam-
ily’, which excluded the contributions that could be offered by
friends, relations or others who were not sexual partners.
Furthermore, despite this supposed recognition of diverse fam-
ily formations, New Labour policies continued to uphold the idea
that long-term coupledom is beneﬁcial not just for family mem-
bers and children, but for communities and for the nation. For
example, the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Group on Marriage and
Relationship Support stated that ‘the adult couple [...] is the corner-
stone of the family. Strong and stable relationships beneﬁt all in
society’ (LCD, 2002: 33). Thus the policy shift away from marriage
did not alter the ways in which the heteronormative narrative
works; ‘community’ was still ‘imagined through scenes of inti-
macy, coupling, and kinship’ and futurity is reductively ‘restricted
to generational narrative and reproduction’ (Berlant and Warner,
1998: 554). This pro-couple rhetoric bears close resemblance to
some of the arguments used by Christian right groups when
attempting to preserve heterosexual marriage from the ‘threat’ of
same-sex marriage. In these narratives the married heterosexual
couple provides the bedrock of community and national values,
with homosexuality depicted as threat to Western civilization
(Jakobsen, 2002; Cobb, 2006). The expansion of this heteronorma-
tive rhetoric to include non-married couples, and lesbian and gay
couples under New Labour hence did little to challenge or denatu-
ralize the reductive and exclusionary assumption that strong cou-
ples are the foundation of not just strong families, but also a strong
nation. This underlines that the mononormative familial nation is
not a natural phenomenon with complex discursive strategies
and legal structures working to maintain its privileged status (Phil-
lips, 2009).
Despite the introduction of the Civil Partnership Act it appears
that the couple-centric familial nation remained unchallenged,
and the basic premise upon which citizenship is granted was not
brought into question. The parliamentary debates around Civil
Partnership often presented a homonormative image of monoga-
mous, committed, responsible lesbian and gay citizens, where
same-sex couples are depicted as equally loving, and equally as
beneﬁcial to the wider community and the nation (see Duggan,
2002 for further discussion about homonormativity). Lesbian and
gay partnerships have been incorporated into an existing hetero-
normative framework that values coupled-love, commitment and
longevity. Anna Marie Smith (1994: 204), in her discussion about
the ﬁgure of the ‘good homosexual’, suggests certain lesbian and
gay subjects ‘can be added to the social order without any funda-
mental transformation’. Yet the Civil Partnership Act is about more
than simply just inclusion into the existing order for, as Bell and
Binnie (2000: 58) highlight, the legal recognition of same-sex part-
nerships ‘could have the function of reafﬁrming marriage as an
institution’. I am interested in thinking about how the Civil Part-
nership Act can be understood as sending out a wider message
about which forms of intimate relationships have value, and which
do not. For example, when introducing the Civil Partnership Bill to
the House of Commons, Labour MP Jacqui Smith claimed that ‘the
Bill sends a clear message about the importance of stable andn families’, citizenship and the state promotion of coupledom. Geoforum
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osexual binary was not always quite so clear cut, as some forms of homosexuality
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ment about this country’s support for stable, long-term committed
relationships’ (HC, Hansard, 12/10/04: column 174 and 175). Long-
term relationships were understood to be in decline in Britain, and
therefore committed lesbian and gay couples were seen as being
able to send out a timely reminder to their failing heterosexual
counterparts. Conservative MP Alan Duncan put forward the case
that civil partnership will be ‘a way of protecting the family in
changed times, not of damaging it’ (HC, Hansard, 12/10/04: column
187), claiming that:
...the argument that they [same-sex couples] will damage the
institution of marriage still does not stack up. If we preach that
the values inherent in marriage – love, mutual commitment and
responsibility – strengthen and enrich society, how can we
claim that the replication of such values for gay couples will
cause damage? Imitation is, after all, the sincerest form of ﬂat-
tery... [it] makes even more sense now to approve civil partner-
ships. (HC, Hansard, 12/10/04: column 188)
The political debates about the introduction of Civil Partnership
were not solely framed as matters of gay and lesbian equality, but
were also presented as part of a wider aim of strengthening the
importance of long-term coupled relationships. For example,
Conservative MP Robert Key claimed ‘that the Bill will enhance
the institution of marriage by increasing public approval for stable,
committed, loving interdependent relationships in society’ (HC,
Hansard, 2004: Column 207). For certain MPs, it seems that the
debate around Civil Partnerships gave them the opportunity to
underline the importance of committed conjugal coupledom (see
Stychin, 2006a, for a more in-depth analysis of these parliamentary
debates).5
3. Lessons in Love? ‘Broken families’ and ‘broken Britain’
So far this article has explored some of the ways in which les-
bian and gay couples became incorporated into dominant policy
ideals of ‘family’. These inclusions to citizenship have had a mate-
rial effect not just on the political identities of the group who are
newly included (Smith, 1994)6 but also on those who are excluded.
Therefore it is important to continue to question who may still be
excluded from these current models of mononormative citizenship.
In order to think this through, I turn to Doreen Massey’s discussion
of the ways in which care and responsibility are still so often associ-
ated with proximity. Massey states that:
[...] certainly in Western societies, there is a hegemonic geogra-
phy of care and responsibility which takes the form of a nested
set of Russian dolls. First there is ‘home’, then perhaps place or
locality, then nation, and so on. There is a kind of accepted
understanding that we care ﬁrst for, and have our ﬁrst respon-
sibilities towards, those nearest in (Massey, 2004: 8–9).
However, governmental rhetoric about coupledom implies that
if you care for those ‘nearest in’ then you are also somehow caring
for society and the nation; that there is a link between having a
good, normative coupled life and being a good citizen. In these nar-
ratives people’s intimate lives are not just private, but directly link
to a wider societal good, the links between the intimate and the5 The Civil Partnership Act could be read as a straightforward mononormative
reinforcement of the couple form. However, such a reading perhaps runs the risk of
inadvertently upholding the power of mononormativity. It is important to note that
these parliamentary debates and policy documents simultaneously highlight the
fragility of long-term coupledom and its diminution within contemporary British
society.
6 In this article I do not explore the lived experience of Civil Partnership, or how
this notion of the ‘good responsible gay citizen’ may be challenged and subverted in
everyday life (see Smart, 2007; Weeks et al., 2001).
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a stable couple you are ‘doing your bit’ for the nation, and working
towards the common good (see LCD, 2002). Loyalty to your partner
becomes synonymous with loyalty to the nation. Consequently
these positive narratives about the wider good of coupledom can-
not help but exclude and further marginalize those who are not part of
a coupled relationship. If strong families and couples create a strong
nation then the reverse of this narrative also applies. The break-
down of couples, and the ‘collapse’ of the family is often portrayed
as inextricably connected to the disintegration of the nation (see
Barlow and Duncan, 2000a). To not be in—or even worse, to not
even aspire to be in—a long-term coupled relationship can be de-
picted not just as a personal failure, but as a failure to society as
a whole.
In Britain it therefore now appears that citizenship is no longer
clearly delineated on the basis of a heterosexual/homosexual bin-
ary, but between couples and the uncoupled.7 Despite the supposed
moves towards greater equality, the supreme logic of the child-bear-
ing couple appears still to dominate British policy. The government
speaks of the importance of long-term committed coupledom as
the basis of ‘family values’, eschewing any discussion of single val-
ues. To be single is to seemingly be valueless; or worse, to be unat-
tached is to be reckless, narcissistic, immature, and selﬁsh (Cobb,
2007; DePaulo and Morris, 2006; Reynolds, 2008). Consequently,
broken relationships are still portrayed as one of the nation’s biggest
social problems and the cause of almost all that is wrong in British
society today. For example, a headline in the British centre-right
broadsheet The Daily Telegraph reads ‘Broken Britain needs lessons
in love’ (Knapton, 2009). This story was a summary of a report by
the Children’s Society entitled A Good Childhood: Searching for Values
in a Competitive Age (2009) written by Lord Layard, a former advisor
to Tony Blair.8 The report claimed that ‘excessive individualism’ had
led to high rates of family break-up in Britain, with women’s greater
ﬁnancial independence listed as one of the reasons for this increased
individualism and consequent rising divorce rates. The Daily Tele-
graph summarizes the Layard report by stating that ‘Britain has been
damaged by rampant individualism... the selﬁsh ethos needs to be
replaced by a greater sense of personal responsibility and the com-
mon good’ (Knapton, 2009: np). Separation, or a deliberate refusal
to be coupled, becomes narrated as a selﬁsh act that contributes to
the breakdown of society.
The Daily Telegraph went onto claim that ‘[t]he country needs a
radical shift towards an ethos of love’ (Knapton, 2009: np). The
implication here is that in an increasingly individualized society
people have forgotten how to love properly, and that the values
of love need to be learnt again. Yet it is the coupled two-parent
family that is seen as crucial for teaching children these ‘lessons
in love’; somewhat paradoxically love is seen as both the problem
and the answer.9 As Stychin (2006b: 29) notes, ‘the family is cited
for its central role in producing responsible, active new citizens,
and as providing a counterbalance to rugged individualism and
atomization’. Love is portrayed as providing a vital form of security
and comfort in an increasingly individualized world (see Beck and
Beck-Gernsheim, 1995 for further examples of how this narrativewere included into the imagined nation (the responsible private gay citizen) whilst
some forms of heterosexuality were othered (the heterosexual single mother for
example) (see Smith, 1994).
8 Tony Blair was the Prime Minister for the majority of New Labour’s time in
government (1997–2007).
9 See Ahmed (2003) for a similar discussion about how the notion of ‘love thy
neighbour’ was taken up in government policy surrounding multiculturism after the
‘race riots’ in northern England in 2001. These riots were often reduced down to an
issue a loveless nation, a personal failure to love ‘the other’, and thus profoundly
individualized.
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regarding tighter controls around eligibility for state beneﬁts (Larkin, 2007).
12 Although New Labour were careful not to imply that a two-parent family was
necessarily required for ‘good’ parenting, a number of their policy documents were
very contradictory— containing claims about the dangers of stigmatizing lone
parenthood, but at the same time citing evidence that a child’s life chances were
improved if brought up in a two parent family (see DCSF, 2008).
13 Though some policy documents do recognize that it is the ﬁnancial hardship that
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ten the moral codes that derive from long-term commitment, and
that children need a stable two-parent family to learn the values
of love. It is claimed that this so-called ‘parenting deﬁcit’ has re-
sulted in a ‘moral deﬁcit’. Britain is broken because it has forgotten
how to love; and consequently the proposed solution to the nation’s
problems is to encourage people to love again and to make their rela-
tionships endure.
During the period of New Labour government there was hence a
conscious attempt to teach the nation these ‘lessons in love’. Long-
term stable couples were seen as crucial for raising healthy chil-
dren, and the key to building strong communities and a strong na-
tion. As Barlow and Duncan (2000b: 140) note, New Labour were
attempting to ‘remould family structures and practices’ in a way
that would ‘better promote social cohesion’. The government
claimed that it had made a ‘commitment to support couple rela-
tionships’, and was looking at ways in which ‘partners can be sup-
ported to sustain and strengthen their couple relationship at
different life stages’ (DCSF, 2010b: iii). Rather than seeing the per-
sonal sphere as something private, a number of government
schemes explicitly attempted to shape and inﬂuence the nation’s
intimate lives.10 One example of this can be seen in 2008, when
the government sponsored a national ‘relationship summit’. Ed Balls,
in his then role as Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Fam-
ilies, met with some of the nation’s ‘most famous’ agony aunts from
tabloid newspapers and magazines. The government claimed that it
wished to support families via offering them relationship advice and
helping to reduce conﬂict when relationships break down. After the
summit Balls announced that £6 m would be used on ‘marriage and
relationship support’ through the Children, Young People and Fami-
lies programme (HC, Hansard, 25/02/09: 807). In recognition of the
additional strains placed on family relationships during the current
so-called ‘age of austerity’, New Labour pledged an extra £3.1 million
to voluntary organizations to enhance their services (DCSF, 2010a:
4.16). Yet when analysing New Labour family policy it becomes clear
that there are some rather mixed messages communicated via their
approach to relationship support. The government claimed that they
want to use these charities to help support families going through
separations, yet at the same time the rest of this policy document
stressed the importance of couples staying together (DCSF, 2010a).
One of the other key ways in which the government has been
attempting to teach people these ‘lessons in love’ is via the national
school curriculum. In 2000 Sex and Relationships Education (SRE)
was introduced to British schools in order to emphasize the impor-
tance of relationships and commitment, rather than just solely the
practicalities of safer sex. This was the ﬁrst time that British
schools had a national framework to support lessons on intimate
relationships and personal life. One government report claimed
that this education was necessary as ‘teenagers need speciﬁc ad-
vice about forming loving, stable relationships as adults’ (DCSF,
2010b: 110). Another document from the Department of Education
and Employment claims that SRE is ‘about the understanding of the
importance of marriage for family life, stable and loving relation-
ships, respect, love and care’ (DfEE, 2000: 5). Yet once again the
government was careful not to imply that marriage is the only
form of relationship that is valued, stating that:
[...] there are strong and mutually supportive relationships out-
side marriage. Therefore pupils should learn the signiﬁcance of
marriage and stable relationships as key building blocks of com-
munity and society. Care needs to be taken to ensure that there10 This is of course not to claim that previous governments have not also intervened
in personal life and intimate relationships. However, New Labour has perhaps been
the most open about the intent of their policies.
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However, it is questionable as to whether this sort of language
cannot help but further stigmatize those who fall outside of these
idealized notions of coupledom. Likewise, the predominant focus
on the familial devalues the multitude of spaces where young peo-
ple may feel loved and cared for, and continues to marginalize
those who have not been brought up in supportive families. For
example, in the 2010 Green Paper Support for All, the government
claims that ‘[s]trong families give children love, identity, a personal
history [...] They also help build understanding and mutual respect
across generations’ (DCSF, 2010a: 22). The effects of this sort of
rhetoric on the self-esteem of those who were not brought up in
these idealized loving families is never fully addressed in these pol-
icy documents.
Furthermore, it is important to note the ways in which both the
funding for relationship charities and the new educational frame-
work, are based on advice and support rather than control and
sanctions, and thus sit contradictorily with some of New Labour’s
more punitive and disciplinary measures.11 These policies can be
seen as in accordance with the precepts of neoliberal governance,
encouraging self-governing reﬂexive subjects. ‘Broken families’ are
reduced to a problem that can be ﬁxed by counselling and better
education; often the ﬁnancial hardships that certain couples go
through, and wider structural determinants of the couple form, are
downplayed in these policies. For example, in a speech to the Relate
Institute, New Labour’s Health Secretary Alan Johnson (2007)
claimed that poor parenting is the key cause of social exclusion,
and low attainment, stating that ‘[p]arenting outstrips every other
factor — including social class, ethnicity or disability — in its impact
on [child] attainment’.12 Thus, this turn to education and counselling
represents ‘broken relationships’ as primarily the result of individual
problems, rather than broader socio-economic deprivation or state
failures.13 Consequently, responsibility for ‘broken Britain’ has at
times become profoundly individualized: the problems Britain faces
will be solved by better parenting founded in stronger coupled rela-
tionships (Home Ofﬁce, 2006). Relationship breakdown becomes a
scapegoat on which to blame the nation’s ills. Rhetoric about the
couple as the foundation of the nation becomes a way for the state
to bypass its own responsibilities, and downplay the economic and
structural problems within the British nation.14
4. The future of family policy under the Coalition government
Under the current Coalition government Britain has seen an
intensiﬁcation of the idea that a key cause of ‘Broken Britain’ is
the breakdown of families (Lister and Bennett, 2010). Prime Minis-
ter David Cameron has claimed that a whole host of problems are a
direct result of the decline of the family and relationship break-
down, such as youth crime and anti-social behaviour. For example,follows relationship breakdown that is the key issue, rather than necessarily
relationship breakdown itself (see DCSF, 2008).
14 There are other clear, and perhaps more explicit, examples of ways in which
nation states use their ‘progressive’ position on LGBT rights to mask other inequalities
(for example, see Puar’s (2011) work on Israel’s practices of ‘pinkwashing’, and the
ways in which this is used to divert attention away from their occupation of
Palestinian territories).
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state, there was still a neoliberal agenda that sought to shift responsibility from the
6 E. Wilkinson / Geoforum xxx (2013) xxx–xxxthe ‘riots’ that took place in some parts of England in 2011 were of-
ten depicted as a consequence of broken families and poor parent-
ing (CSJ, 2011). Cameron (2011) blamed these acts on a lack of
parental responsibility, in particular singling out ‘children without
fathers’. Making ‘stronger families’ founded upon ‘stable relation-
ships’ was again invoked as a key strategy to mend ‘broken Britain’,
with the Prime Minister claiming that ‘[i]f we want to have any
hope of mending our broken society, family and parenting is where
we’ve got to start’ (see Harker and Martin, 2012). Families founded
upon long-term committed couples were seen as central to the na-
tion, not just in their role in biological reproduction, but also in
reproducing appropriate moral codes (Kirby, 2009). This resulted
in David Cameron (2011) proposing that he would introduce a
‘family test’ that would be applied to all domestic policy, claiming
that ‘[i]f it hurts families, if it undermines commitment, if it tram-
ples over the values that keeps people together... then we shouldn’t
do it’.
Those who do not, cannot, or will not form ‘proper’ long-lasting
coupled relationships have thus been depicted in recent policy
rhetoric as a key source of many of the nation’s problems, and a
threat to the nation itself (see CSJ, 2010 for a discussion about
the ‘problem’ of broken relationships and the social good of mar-
ried two-parent families). However, this emphasis on long-term
coupledom did not really mark a shift in government policy, and
the framework for this kind of rhetoric was partially set out under
the New Labour government: indeed, when in opposition in the
1990s Tony Blair had campaigned for stronger communities draw-
ing attention to housing estates where few children were being
raised by their biological parents and where errant fathers were
the norm (see Hubbard, 2000). It is therefore important to note
that party lines seem increasingly blurred when it comes to family
policy and although many might expect a return to ‘traditional’
(heterosexual) family values from the Conservative-led coalition,
their current moves towards same-sex marriage seems to suggest
otherwise. Current policy documents imply continuity rather than
a break with New Labour family policy, as aspects of these policies
seemingly cross party-political boundaries (Klett-Davies, 2012).15
However, when same-sex marriage is introduced in Britain we
may in fact see a narrowing of the range of ‘appropriate’ intimacies,
with a return to the promotion or marriage rather than the accep-
tance of a diverse range of family forms. It remains to be seen
whether the Coalition government will use the legalization of
same-sex marriage as an opportunity to push forward a narrowmar-
riage-agenda that will further exclude those who are not part of a
conjugal couple.
Yet, perhaps this bipartisan support for lesbian and gay rights
becomes more explicable when we take into account the social
and economic backdrop in which these changes have taken place.
Wilson (2010) has argued that these progressive moves towards
greater rights for lesbian and gay couples have often been won
not solely on the grounds of liberal appeals to justice, inclusion
and equality, but also as a consequence of the rising economic cost
of care provision for the state. Wilson highlights that the recogni-
tion of same-sex partnerships has come at a time when many
countries in Europe are facing a so-called ‘care-crunch’, with a ris-
ing number of people needing care but with fewer people to pro-
vide it. In effect, the state promotion of long-term coupledom
supports and naturalizes the privatization of care within the family
home. This implies that the inclusion of same-sex couples into the
imagined British nation is not just about sexual equality, but rather
there seem to be quite clear economic reasons for this shift in
policy. The explicit economic incentives for the promotion of15 However, there are a number profound contradictions within the Coalition’s
family policy, and their support of same-sex marriage sits uneasily with rhetoric
about the problems of ‘fatherless families’ (Cameron, 2011).
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Act by the Department for Trade and Industry:
Strengthening adult couple relationships not only beneﬁts the
couples themselves, but also other relatives they support and
care for, and, in particular, their children as they grow up and
become the couples, parents and carers of tomorrow (DTI, 2004:
16, emphasis added).
If there is an explicit economic incentive for the government to
promote long-term relationships, then conversely, living outside
the couple-form can be understood as costly and potentially dam-
aging to the nation. It is important to note that long-term couple-
dom is not just depicted as beneﬁcial in terms of privatizing care in
the home — the breakdown of coupled relationships is seen as an
expensive burden on the state. A report by the independent think
tank the Relationships Foundation claims that relationship break-
down costs the taxpayer an estimated £37 billion pounds annually.
This ﬁgure has now been cited by the Coalition government, with
some ministers inﬂating the ﬁgure even further; with Iain Duncan
Smith (2010), the Secretary for State Work and Pensions, claiming
that that relationship breakdown could cost society ‘up to £100 bil-
lion’. These costs are calculated by looking at a number of areas,
with one of the most signiﬁcant being the supposed increase in
claims to state beneﬁts caused by divorce and relationship break-
down. The Relationships Foundation (2011: 8) claim that ‘60% of
women who divorce go onto social security beneﬁts immediately’
and that ‘lone parents receive average tax credit and beneﬁt pay-
ments ﬁve times larger than couples’. Here, separation and lone
parenthood are framed as a costly economic problem, and it is ar-
gued that ‘taxpayers pick up many of the costs when relationships
breakdown’ (Relationships Foundation, 2011: 4). In these portray-
als there is no discussion about the need to provide more state sup-
port for women in low socio-economic positions who are left in a
ﬁnancially precarious position after their relationship come to an
end, instead the answer to these problems is simply to encourage
more couples to stay together. Hence, long-term coupledom is not
just the foundation of the nation in terms of the reproduction of
children, or the reproduction of moral values, couples are seen to
play a key role in the reduction of state beneﬁts. As Anderson
(1991) notes, elites in society have always had most inﬂuence over
the narratives we tell about the nation, and consequently these
seeming moves toward greater sexual equality need to be under-
stood as also serving the interest of those in power. The state pro-
motion of coupledom comes at a time when Britain is witnessing a
signiﬁcant reduction of public sector spending on welfare bene-
ﬁts.16 The British nation might therefore be regarded as economi-
cally dependent upon the continuation of the couple form;
coupledom provides the economic base to the nation and helps fur-
ther the retrenchment of certain sections of the welfare state.
5. Conclusion
This article examined how New Labour attempted to respond to
the so-called ‘crisis’ in intimate life (fewer marriages, more cohab-
iting couples, and more single-headed households) through at-
tempts to promote the importance of long-term committed
coupled relationships. I highlighted the ways in which family pol-
icy under New Labour saw a shift from promoting ‘the family’ tostate to the private sector and to the individual (Barker and Lamble, 2009). New
Labour’s policy on welfare reform was clearly underpinned by a desire for ‘economic
efﬁciency’ (Barlow and Duncan (2000a): 27), and cutting back on certain forms of ‘bad
welfare’ (beneﬁts) in order to reallocate resources to ‘good welfare’ (health and
education) (Powell, 2000).
n families’, citizenship and the state promotion of coupledom. Geoforum
E. Wilkinson /Geoforum xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 7‘families’ via the 2004 Civil Partnership Act. Nevertheless, despite
successive government attempts to recognize a diverse range of
family formations, I argued that family policy still presented a
rather narrow understanding of what intimate life could be. In-
stead of speaking of the married heterosexual couple, government
policy began to talk about the importance of long-term committed
couples, regardless of sexual orientation. There was a move away
from the assumption that the nation is founded upon the hetero-
sexual bond to the idea that ‘[s]trong and healthy relationships
are [...] paramount regardless of the structure’ (DCSF, 2008: 8).
Thus despite the supposed recognition of diverse family forms,
long-term coupled relationships were still depicted as essential
to the wider community, society and the nation. As a result, those
who were not part of a couple were depicted as failures; and not
just personal failures, but a failure to the nation as a whole. Despite
the New Labour government claiming that it was offering ‘support
for all’, it is clear that certain forms of intimate attachment were
promoted as more important than others. Moreover, what was
lacking in these governmental debates was any consideration of
what makes these changes and shifts in family formation both pos-
sible and even desirable for many people. The idea that long-term
coupledom might be dysfunctional is never considered, and there
is no critical questioning of why these changes in family formation
have come about, or that it might be dangerous to continue to
encourage people to enter into, or remain within, privatized iso-
lated coupled relationships. As Smith (1994: 89) notes, the ‘phan-
tasmatic construction of the family as the antagonism-free centre
of the British nation’ stands at odds with the lived reality of family
life given the family home, far from being a haven and retreat, can
so often be a space of exclusion, control, violence and abuse (see
also Warrington, 2001). Under New Labour coupledom was seen
as the solution to the nation’s problems rather than a potential
problem in itself. The government failed to recognize the systemic
structural inequalities that are built into the marriage contract and
the economic dependencies it creates.
In this article I outlined the importance of thinking critically
about how coupledom is naturalized and privileged whilst the
non-coupled are excluded and stigmatized.17 The non-coupled con-
tinue to fall outside of the remit of mononormative notions of citi-
zenship (Bell and Binnie, 2000; Hubbard, 2001), and thus remain
excluded from these ‘new equalities landscapes’. Consequently,
framing debates about rights and equality solely around notions of
sexual citizenship does little to help challenge the normative ways
in which sexual-romantic love forms the basis of citizenship (Cobb,
2007). The state promotion of coupledom excludes not just those
whose sexual encounters are far from romantic, but also those for
whom sex and romance may not be the key intimate attachment
in their lives. Thus dominant notions of sexual citizenship continue
to exclude those who might be single, asexual, or those who see
friendship, or other forms of kinship as their most important inti-
mate connections (Budgeon, 2008; Carrigan, 2011; Roseneil, 2004).
In order to denaturalize the mononormative nation it is important
to challenge the idea that coupledom should be the marker of citi-
zenship. Therefore, although this article has focused solely on the
UK, I hope this research may speak across geographic boundaries,
in order to think about how mononormativity plays out in other na-
tion-states. Comparative work may enable us to think further about
whether the increased acceptance of lesbian and gay partnerships
necessarily comes hand in hand with the increased privileging of
the sexual-romantic couple form.17 Of course this coupled/non-coupled binary needs further consideration, and the
classed dimensions to these distinctions should not be overlooked, as there is clearly a
different narrative at work when speaking about the single-mother who receives
state welfare, in comparison to the portrayal of the single middle-class career woman.
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in which space serves to normalize coupledom (Johnston and
Longhurst, 2010; Oswin, 2010; Ramdas, 2012), and the concept
of mononormativity has yet to be fully explored. In this respect it
is worth remembering that government policy and education rep-
resents just one domain where mononormativity is reproduced.
Attention also needs to be given to the more mundane and
everyday spaces in which mononormativity is both enforced and
challenged, including diverse spaces of work, rest and play. Docu-
menting where coupledom is produced, regulated and normalized
is one important route to identifying where it can be resisted,
allowing geographers to play an important role in challenging
the inequalities that persist at the heart of the nation-state.References
Adeniji, A., 2001. In: Bertilsdotter, H. (Ed.), Ordningsstörande begär: Biteori som
kritik av antropologisk sexualitetsforskning, 5. Lambda Nordica, pp. 1–2.
Ahmed, S., 2003. In the name of love. Borderlands: e-Journal 2 (3).
Anderson, B., 1991. Imagined Communities: Reﬂections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Verso, London.
Barker, M., Langdridge, D., 2010. Whatever happened to non-monogamies? Critical
reﬂections on recent research and theory. Sexualities 13 (6), 748–772.
Barker, N., Lamble, S., 2009. From social security to individual responsibility:
sanctions, conditionality, and punitiveness in the welfare reform Bill 2009 (Part
One). Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 31 (3), 321–332.
Barlow, A., Duncan, S., 2000a. Supporting families? New labour’s communitarianism
and the ‘Rationality Mistake’ Part I. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 22
(1), 23–42.
Barlow, A., Duncan, S., 2000b. Supporting families? New labour’s
communitarianism and the ‘Rationality Mistake’ Part II. Journal of Social
Welfare and Family Law 22 (2), 129–143.
Beck, U., Beck-Gernsheim, E., 1995. The Normal Chaos of Love. Polity Press,
Cambridge.
Bell, D., Binnie, J., 2000. The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond. Polity Press,
Cambridge.
Bell, D., Binnie, J., 2006. Geographies of sexual citizenship. Political Geography 25,
869–873.
Berlant, L., Warner, M., 1998. Sex in public. Critical Inquiry 24, 547–566.
Budgeon, S., 2008. Couple culture and the production of singleness. Sexualities 11
(3), 301–316.
Browne, K., 2011. By partner we mean ...: alternative geographies of ‘gay marriage’.
Sexualities 14 (1), 100–122.
Carrigan, M., 2011. There’s more to life than sex? Difference and commonality
within the asexual community. Sexualities 14 (4), 462–478.
Cameron, D., 2011. Speech on Troubled Families, Sandwell Christian Centre,
Oldbury. <http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2011/12/
troubledfamilies-family> (15.12.11).
Cobb, M., 2006. God Hates Fags: The Rhetorics of Religious Violence. New York
University Press, New York.
Cobb, M., 2007. lonely. South Atlantic Quarterly 106 (3), 445–457.
Cooper, D., Herman, D., 1991. Getting the family right: legislating heterosexuality in
Britain, 1986–1991. Canadian Journal of Family Law 10, 41–63.
Centre for Social Justice, 2010. Green Paper on the Family. Centre for Social Justice,
London.
Centre for Social Justice, 2011. Strengthening the Family and Tackling Family
Breakdown. Centre for Social Justice, London.
Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S., 1998. The Landscape of Qualitative Research. Sage,
London.
Department for Children Schools and Families., 2008. Families in Britain Evidence
Paper. HMSO, London.
Department for Children Schools and Families, 2010a. Support for All: The Families
and Relationships Green Paper. HMSO, London.
Department for Children Schools and Families, 2010b. Relationships Matter:
Understanding the Needs of Adults Regarding Relationship Support, Research
Report DCSF 2010- RR233. Institute of Health and Society, Newcastle.
Department for Education and Employment, 2000. Sex and Relationship Education
Guidance. HMSO, London.
Department of Trade and Industry, 2004. Final Regulatory Impact Assessment: Civil
Partnerships. <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ria/full_civil-partnership.pdf>.
DePaulo, B.M., Morris, W.L.M., 2006. The unrecognized stereotyping and
discrimination against singles. Current Directions in Psychological Science 15
(5), 251–254.
Duggan, L., 2002. The new homonormativity: the sexual politics of neo-liberalism.
In: Castronovo, R., Nelson, D.D. (Eds.), Materializing Democracy. Duke
University Press, Durham.
Duncan, S., Smith, D., 2003. Geographies of family formations: spatial differences
and gender cultures in Britain. Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers 27, 471–493.
Edwards, R., Duncan, S., 1997. Supporting the family: lone mothers, paid work and
the underclass debate. Critical Social Policy 17 (4), 29–49.n families’, citizenship and the state promotion of coupledom. Geoforum
8 E. Wilkinson / Geoforum xxx (2013) xxx–xxxFairclough, N., 2000. New labour: new language? Routledge, London.
Harker, C., Martin, L., 2012. Familial relations: spaces, subjects and politics.
Environment and Planning A 44 (4), 768–775.
Home Ofﬁce, 1998. Supporting families: a consultation document. HMSO, London.
Home Ofﬁce, 1999. Supporting Families: Summary of Responses. HMSO, London.
Home Ofﬁce, 2006. Respect Action Plan. Respect Task Force. HMSO, London.
Hubbard, P., 2000. Desire/disgust: mapping the moral contours of heterosexuality.
Progress in Human Geography 24, 191–203.
Hubbard, P., 2001. Sex zones: intimacy, citizenship and public space. Sexualities 4,
51–68.
Hubbard, P., this issue. Kissing is not a universal right: sexuality, law and the scales
of citizenship. Geoforum. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.08.002.
Jakobsen, J., 2002. Can Homosexuals End Western Civilization as We know it?
Family Values in a Global Economy. In: Cruz-Malave, A., Manalansan, M. (Eds.),
Queer Globalization / Local Homosexualities. New York University Press, New
York.
Johnson, A., 2007. Strong Families, Strong Society, Inaugural Lecture to the Relate
Institute, February 2007, London. .
Johnston, L., Longhurst, R., 2010. Space, Place, and Sex: Geographies of Sexualities.
Rowman & Littleﬁeld, New York.
Kirby, J., 2009. From broken families to the broken society. The Political Quarterly
80 (2), 243–247.
Klett-Davies, M., 2012. A review of social trends and family and relationships policies
in England and Wales (1997-2011). Families, Relationships, Societies 1 (1).
Knapton, S., 2009. Broken Britain Needs Lessons in Love. The Telegraph 02/02/09.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/family/4425528/Broken-Britain-needs-lessons-
in-love.html>.
Larkin, P.M., 2007. The ‘Criminalization’ of social security law: towards a punitive
welfare state? Journal of Law and Society 34 (3), 295–320.
Layard, R., 2009. A Good Childhood: Searching for Values in a Competitive Age.
Penguin, London.
Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2002. Moving Forward Together: A Proposed
Strategy for Marriage and Relationship Support for 2002 and Beyond. HMSO,
London.
Lister, R., 2001. New Labour: a study in ambiguity from a position of ambivalence.
Critical Social Policy 21 (4), 425–447.
Lister, R., Bennett, F., 2010. The new ‘champion of progressive ideals’? Cameron’s
Conservative Party: poverty, family policy and welfare reform. Renewal: A
Journal of Social Democracy 18 (1–2), 84–109.
Massey, D., 2004. Geographies of responsibility. Geograﬁska Annaler: Series B,
Human Geography 86, 5–18.
Mayer, T. (Ed.), 2000. Gendered Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation.
Routledge, London and New York.
McDermott, E., 2011. The world some have won: sexuality, class and inequality.
Sexualities 14 (1), 63–78.
Nast, H., 1998. Unsexy geographies. Gender place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist
Geography 5 (2), 191–206.
Oswin, N., 2010. The modern model family at home in singapore: a queer
geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35, 256–268.
Peel, E., Harding, R., 2008. Recognizing and celebrating same-sex relationships:
beyond the normative debate. Sexualities 11 (6), 659–666.
Phillips, R., 2009. Settler colonialism and the nuclear family. Canadian Geographer
53 (2), 239–253.
Pieper, M., Bauer, R., 2005. Call for Papers: International Conference on Polyamory
and Mono-Normativity. Research Centre for Feminist, Gender & Queer Studies,
University of Hamburg, November, 5th 2005.Please cite this article in press as: Wilkinson, E. Learning to love again: ‘Broke
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.02.012Plummer, K., 2001. The square of intimate citizenship: some preliminary proposals.
Citizenship Studies 5, 237–253.
Plummer, K., 2003. Intimate Citizenship: Private Decisions and Public Dialogues.
University of Washington Press, Seattle.
Powell, M., 2000. New Labour and the third way in the British welfare state: a new
and distinctive approach? Critical Social Policy 20 (1), 39–60.
Puar, J., 2011. Citation and censorship: the politics of talking about the sexual
politics of Israel. Feminist Legal Studies 19 (2), 133–142.
Ramdas, K., 2012. Women in Waiting? Singlehood, marriage, and family in
Singapore. Environment and Planning A 44 (4), 832–848.
Relationships Foundation, 2011. When Relationships Go Wrong: Counting the Cost
of Family Failure. <http://www.relationshipsfoundation.org>.
Reynolds, J., 2008. The single woman: a discursive investigation. Taylor & Francis,
London.
Rich, A., 1980. Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs 5, 631–660.
Richardson, D., 2000. Rethinking sexuality. Sage, London.
Richardson, E.H., Turner, B.S., 2001. Sexual, intimate or reproductive citizenship?
Citizenship Studies 5 (3), 329–338.
Roseneil, S., 2004. Why we should Care about Friends: An Argument for Queering
the Care Imaginary in Social Policy. Social Policy and Society 3, 409–419.
Roseneil, S., 2010. Intimate citizenship: a pragmatic, yet radical, proposal
for a politics of personal life. European Journal of Women’s Studies 17 (1),
77–82.
Roseneil, S., Budgeon, S., 2004. Cultures of intimacy and care beyond the family:
personal life and social change in the early twenty-ﬁrst century. Current
Sociology 52 (2), 135–159.
Rubin, G., 1984. Thinking sex: notes for a radical theory of the politics of sexuality.
In: Rubin, G., Vance, C. (Eds.), Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality.
Pandora Press, London.
Smart, C., 2007. Same sex couples and marriage: negotiating relational landscapes
with families and friends. Sociological Review 55, 671–686.
Smith, A.M., 1994. New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain, 1968–1990.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Smith, A.M., 2007. Welfare Reform and Sexual Regulation. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Smith, I.D., 2010. Relate Annual Conference. <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/newsroom/
ministers-speeches/2010/03-11-10.shtml> (03.11.10).
Stychin, C.F., 2006a. ‘Las Vegas is Not Where we Are’: Queer Readings of the Civil
Partnership Act. Political Geography 25, 899–920.
Stychin, C.F., 2006b. Family Friendly? Rights, Responsibilities and Relationship
Recognition. In: Diduck, A., O’Donavan, K. (Eds.), Feminist Perspectives on
Family Law. Routledge, London and New York.
Taylor, Y., 2011. Sexualities and class. Sexualities 14 (1), 3–11.
Warrington, M., 2001. ‘I must get out’: the geographies of domestic violence.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 26 (3), 365–382.
Weeks, J., 2007. The WorldWe Have Won: The Remaking of Erotic and Intimate Life.
Routledge, London.
Weeks, J., Heaphy, B., Donovan, C., 2001. Same Sex Intimacies: Families of Choice
and Other Life Experiments. Routledge, London and New York.
Wilkinson, E., 2012. The romantic imaginary: compulsory coupledom and single
existence. In: Hines, S., Taylor, Y. (Eds.), Sexualities: Reﬂections and Futures.
Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke.
Wilson, A.R., 2010. Feminism and same-sex marriage: who cares? Politics and
Gender 6, 134–145.
Women and Equality Unit, 2003. Responses to Civil Partnership: A Framework for
the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples.n families’, citizenship and the state promotion of coupledom. Geoforum
